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DEFINING AN "INVESTMENT CONTRACT": THE
COMMONALITY REQUIREMENT OF THE HOWEY TEST
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933' ('33 Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 ('34 Act) to protect the investing public from
fraudulent securities transactions.3 To fall within the reach of the '33 and
'34 Acts' regulatory power, a transaction must employ the use of either
interstate commerce or the United States mail, 4 and the transaction must
involve a "security" as defined in the '33 and '34 Acts.' Accordingly, the
more liberal interpretation that courts afford the term "security" under the
1. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933-34) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1982)).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-290, 48 Stat. 881 (1933-34) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1982)).
3. See, e.g., United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1974) (primary purpose
of Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) is to protect
against serious abuses in securities market); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1981)
(Congress adopted '34 Act to restore investor's confidence in financial markets); Note, When
Is A Security Not A Security: Promissory Notes, Loan Participations and Stock In Close
Corporations, 39 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1123, 1128-30 & n.22 (1982) (Congress enacted '33 and
'34 Acts to restore investors' confidence in financial markets after stock market crash of 1929);
see generally FitzGibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate
in the Financial Markets, 64 MINm. L. REv. 893, 912-18 (1980) (discussing relation between
enactment of '33 and '34 Acts and stock market crash of 1929). The general purpose of the '33
Act is to protect investors from fraud and misrepresentation associated with the sale of securities
by requiring that adequate and true information be made available to investors prior to sale.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h, 77j (1982) (disclosure regulations of '33 Act); see also S. REP. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISToRY OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 AND SECURITIEs ExcHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 17, at 1 (. Ellenberger and E. Mahar
eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ELLENBERGER]. Like the '33 Act, the '34 Act protects investors
by requiring continued disclosure of material information that relates to the activity of securities
in secondary markets and, thus, provides a safeguard against destructive speculation. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982) (disclosure regulations of '34 Act); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1934) (quoting President Roosevelt's message to Congress inviting securities legislation),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, item 17.1 (J. Ellenberger and E. Mahar eds. 1973).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The United States Constitution expressly limits Congress'
power over domestic commerce to interstate commerce. Id. The Constitution, therefore,
impliedly limits Congress' power to regulate the transactions of securities to those transactions
involving interstate commerce or the use of the United States mail. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1982) (federal jurisdictional requirements of '33 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (federal
jurisdictional requirements of '34 Act).
5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamp v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring) ('34 Act applies only to purchase and sales of securities); Union Planters Nat'l
Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1179 (6th Cir.) (threshhold question in action
brought under the '33 or '34 Act is whether security exists), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981);
Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 334-35 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (enforcement
of '33 and '34 Acts depends upon existence of security transaction); Titsch Printing, Inc. v.
Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445, 447 (D. Colo. 1978) ('34 Act applies only to securities as defined
in '34 Act).
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'33 and '34 Acts, the broader the potential application of the '33 and '34
Acts' regulatory power. 6 Comparing various courts' interpretations of a
security, however, reveals that, although both the '33 and '34 Acts define
"security" to include an "investment contract, ' 7 uncertainty exists regarding
the types of transactions that actually constitute "investment contracts." S
6. See infra notes 18-92, 160-85 and accompanying text (discussing effect of judicial
interpretations of what transactions constitute securities on application of '33 and '34 Acts).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) ('33 Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a -78kk (1982) ('34 Act). The
'33 Act defines a security as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
The '34 Act defines "security" as follows:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty of lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization, certificate or subscription, transferable share, in-
vestment of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace,
or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1982).
Although the statutory definition of security differs slightly between the '33 Act and the
'34 Act, Congress intended the definitions to be substantially the same, and courts recognize
the two as functionally equivalent. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 847 n.12 (1974) ('33 and '34 Act definitions of "security" are virtually identical and
coverage of two Acts considered same); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967)
(definitions of security in '33 and '34 Acts virtually identical and interpreted substantially same);
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) (Congress intended definitions of security under
'33 and '34 Acts to be substantially same). Additionally, the definition of a security contained
in the '33 and '34 Acts is virtually identical to the definition of a security in the Uniform
Securities Act adopted in over 35 states. See Uniform Securities Act § 401(1) (defining security),
reprinted in BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4931, Ar 727 (1971); see also Note, supra note 3, at 1123
n.2.
8. See-e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221
(6th Cir. 1980) (investment contract requires horizontal commonality between multiple investors
), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 527 (5th
Cir. 1974) (requisite commonality for investment contract exists when single investor's return
depends upon promoter's efforts and expertise); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474
F.2d 476, 484 n.7 (9th Cir.) (investment contract requires interdependency of success between
investor and either third party or other investor), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see also
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The United States Supreme Court on several occasions has attempted to
establish a clear and practical method of determining whether a transaction
constitutes an investment contract under the '33 and '34 Acts. 9 In SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,'0 for example, the Supreme Court initially ruled
that whether an instrument constituted an investment contract depended on
the "character" of the instrument in commerce as established by the char-
acteristics of the transaction and the economic inducements represented to
prospective investors by promoters." In 1946 the Supreme Court in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.'2 refined the Joiner "character" test. The Howey Court
noted that although the '33 Act did not define specifically "investment
contract," state courts had construed the term broadly by disregarding the
form of the transaction in favor of substance and emphasizing the economic
reality of the transaction.'" Relying on the economic reality analysis, the
Howey Court adopted a landmark test to determine whether a contract,
transaction, or scheme constitutes an investment contract under the '33 and
'34 Acts. 14 Under the Howey economic reality test, an investment contract
exists when a person (1) invests money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3)
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of others. Since the estab-
infra notes 17-92 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty among courts concerning the
requirements necessary to characterize instruments or transactions as investment contracts).
Various authorities have recognized the phrase "investment contract" within the '33 and '34
Acts definition of a security as a catch-all phrase in light of the congressional intent that the
term "security" be construed broadly and flexibly to include the various schemes that fall
within the ordinary concept of a security in the commercial world, See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (investment contract embodies flexible principle capable of
reaching many profit-seeking schemes); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)
[hereinafter cited as 1933 HousE REPORT] (Congress intended broad rather than narrow or
restrictive definition of security); 1 L. Loss, SEcuarrms REGULATION, 483-511 (2d ed. 1961)
(courts have employed term "investment contract" as catch-all phrase); see also S.E.C. v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (regulation imposed by '33 Act extends beyond
obvious and commonplace to apply to uncommon and irregular schemes that possess charac-
teristics of investment contract).
9. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's establish-
ment of test defining investment contract); infra notes 97-159 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's various attempts to clarify definition of investment contract).
10. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
11. Id. at 351-53; see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing Joiner).
12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text (discussing Howey).
13. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 & n.5.
14. Id. at 298-301. Expressing the view that economic reality should control the determi-
nation of whether a transaction constitutes an investment contract, the Howey Court found
irrelevant the issue whether formal certificates evidenced an interest in an enterprise. Id. at 299.
The Howey Court also recognized that Congress intended that courts construe the definition of
"security" in the '33 and '34 Acts in a flexible manner to fulfill the intended reach of the Act's
adaptation to meet the various profit seeking schemes devised by those who solicit the use of
other's money. Id.
15. Id. at 301. Since the Supreme Court decided Howey, courts considering the existence
of a security within the meaning of the '33 and '34 Acts definition generally have relied on the
Howey criteria of an investment contract. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337-
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lishment of the Howey test, the Supreme Court periodically has addressed
39 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares in savings and loan possess attributes of investment
contracts as defined in Howey); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
and Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1985) (relying on Howey test in finding that
certificates of deposit constitute investment contracts); Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc.,
741 F.2d 144, 146-47 (7th Cir. 1984) (sale of art with repurchase allowance is not investment
contract under Howey test); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 221-24 (6th Cir. 1980) (discretionary trading accounts do not constitute investment
contracts under Howey test), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540
F.2d 912, 914-915 (8th Cir. 1976) (purchase/management agreement on apartment complex is
not investment contract under Howey test); S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497
F.2d 516, 520-23 (5th Cir. 1974) (options on commodities future contracts constitute investment
contracts under Howey test); S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 480-82 (9th
Cir.) (applying Howey test to pyramid investment schemes), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973);
Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 436, 438-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (discretionary commodity futures account is not investment contract under Howey test);
Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v. Bronze Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085, 1086-88 (D. Colo. 1983)
(condominium purchase/management agreement constitutes investment contract under Howey
test); McLish v. Harris Farms, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1075, 1086-88 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (cattle feedlot
operation constitutes investment contract under Howey test); see also Note, supra note 3, at
1055 n.17 (listing additional cases that have followed Howey test).
In relying on the Howey test, however, courts have relaxed the requirement that investors
must expect profits solely from the efforts of others and have held that profits may result from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others and still satisfy the Howey test. See Turner
Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482; see also United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855-858
(1975) (acknowledging relaxed standard of "sole" requirement enunciated by Turner court).
Having relaxed the "sole" requirement of the Howey test, courts now hold that the proper
inquiry for the third prong of the Howey test is whether the efforts of those other than the
investor constitute the undeniably significant efforts that determine the success or failure of the
enterprise. See Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482 (pyramid investment scheme in which
investors participated, but relied on skill and efforts of promoters for profit, satisfied Howey
test); see also Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976) (control of essential managerial
efforts by those other than investor satisfies third prong of Howey test); McCown v. Heidler,
527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975) (primary reliance for profit for developer's managerial and
development efforts would satisfy third prong of Howey test); Miller v. Central Chinchilla
Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1974) (investor may participate in enterprise as long
as promoter's skill and efforts determine profit potential); accord Union Planters Nat'l Bank
v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 652 F.2d 1174, 1181 n.9 (6th Cir.) (recognizing
relaxed view of Howey test's expectation of profits requirement among circuits), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
The relaxed standard that courts have applied to determine whether an instrument or a
transaction satisfies the third prong of the Howey test apparently requires that the investor lack
either the authority or the expertise and ability to exert meaningful control over the profit
making aspect of the enterprise. See Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F.
Supp. 867, 872 (D. Utah 1981) (courts must consider whether investor or promoter possesses
control over factors essential to success of enterprise in determining whether enterprise satisfies
third prong of Howey test); see, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418-20 (5th Cir.)
(investors' purchase of undeveloped land accompanied by management contract with third party
is insufficient to satisfy Howey test because purchasers retained right to exercise control over
management and use of property), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Fargo Partners v.Dain
Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 913-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (purchase of apartment complex accompanied by
management contract failed to satisfy Howey test because purchaser retained ultimate control
by retaining right to cancel management contract); Darrah v. Garrett, [1984 Transfer Binder]
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certain aspects of the test in an effort to update and clarify the requirements
necessary to qualify an instrument or transaction as an investment contract.
6
Despite the Supreme Court's efforts to clarify the requirements of the
Howey test, uncertainty remains concerning the "commonality" necessary
to fulfill the common enterprise requirement of the Howey test.' 7 Some
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,472 (N.D. Omo 1984) (LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST FAILED TO
MEET Howey test because limited partners actively managed profit making enterprise); Mosher
v. Southridge Assoc., 552 F. Supp. 1231, 1232-33 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (purchase of condominium
held not security under Howey because investor retained right to determine use and management
of condominium); cf. Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669 F.2d 944, 945-47 (4th Cir.) (purchase of limited
partnership interest qualified as investment contract under Howey because limited partners
delegated managerial responsibilities to general partners), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982);
Wooldridge Homes v. Bronze Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085, 1085-86, 1088 (D. Colo. 1983)
(purchase of condominium in preconstruction stage satified Howey test because management
contract bound purchaser, and because purchaser expected capital appreciation from efforts of
developers). For example, discretionary trading accounts between investors and brokers satisfy
the relaxed expectation of profits standard of the Howey test because the broker possesses the
ultimate authority to buy and sell. Walsh, 510 F. Supp. at 872; see Moody v. Bache & Co.,
570 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1978) (discretionary trading account satisfies third prong of Howey
test); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same). Nondiscretionary
trading accounts, on the other hand, fail to satisfy the relaxed standard because the investor
retains the ultimate control regarding whether to buy, sell, or hold. Walsh, 510 F. Supp. at
872; see Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585,
588-89 (M.D. La. 1979) (nondiscretionary trading accounts fail to satisfy third prong of Howey
test).
The relaxed expectation of profits standard, however, continues to require that the ultimate
burden of management or development rest on the promoter/developer or investment manager.
Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, the
profits expected by the investor may arise from either capital appreciation due to a developer's
efforts or direct earnings resulting from the investment manager's efforts. Forman, 421 U.S. at
852. The investor, however, must not benefit from the personal use or enjoyment of the
investment because the necessary expectation of profit then would be absent. See Howey, 328
U.S. at 300 (existence of investment contract requires expectation of return on investment);
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53 (existence of investment contract requires motivation centered on
expectation of return rather than personal consumption); Aldrich, 627 F.2d at 1040 (Howey
expectation of profit does not encompass personal use or enjoyment).
16. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557 (1982) (instrument or transaction must
contain element of risk to investor and must not be so unique as to appear uncharacteristic of
security); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979) (investment
must supply a separable element of consideration for "security" received to satisfy Howey test);
United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855-58 (1975) (Howey test requires that profits
must result from enterpreneurial or managerial efforts of others and cannot come in form of
commodity for personal consumption; infra notes 97-159 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's application of Howey test); see also Casenote, The Definition of Security;
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 29 B.C. L. REV. 1053, 1056-68 (1983) (discussing development of
Howey test).
17. See Morduant v. Incomco, 105 S. Ct. 801, 802 (1985) (lower courts disagree on
requirements of "common enterprise" prong of Howey test); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (6th Cir. 1980) (debate among courts generally
focuses on whether horizontal or vertical commonality satisfies Howey "common enterprise"
requirement), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); infra notes 18-92 and accompanying text (discussing
split among lower courts concerning Howey common enterprise requirement).
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courts, including those in the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, require a
horizontal commonality between investors as an essential element to the
existence of a common enterprise. 8 The term horizontal commonality refers
to an enterprise in which a promoter pools the funds received from multiple
investors and the fortune of each investor is contingent upon the success of
the overall venture.' 9 In essence, each investor's account must constitute an
element of a larger principal account, or investment enterprise, composed of
more than one investor account.20 Additionally, the success of each investor's
account must depend on the overall success of the principal account.2' The
significant characteristic of horizontal commonality is that the principal
account pools the funds received from the individual accounts, rather than
attributing any particular transaction to a specific individual account.22 As a
result, courts applying the horizontal commonality requirement consistently
have found that discretionary trading accounts which involve only a one-to-
one relationship between an investor and a broker do not constitute invest-
ment contracts under the Howey test.2 These courts have explained that the
18. See, e.g., Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460
(3d Cir. 1982) (common enterprise requires pooling of investors' funds); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1980) (common enterprise
requires horizontal relationship that entails pooling of investors' interests), aff'd, 456 US. 353
(1982); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.) (common enterprise
requires joint participation of investors in same investment enterprise), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 311, 319-20 & n.10
(S.D. Ohio 1979) (discretionary account failed to establish common enterprise because of one-
to-one relationship between investor and broker); Sunshine Kitchen v. Alanthus Corp., 403 F.
Supp. 719, 721-22 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (computer sale/management agreement failed to constitute
common enterprise because only one-to-one relationship existed between investor and manager
of investment); Wasnovic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1068-70 (M.D. Pa.
1972) (common enterprise requires pooling of investors' funds), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir.
1973).
19. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d
1174, 1183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); see Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277-78 (7th Cir.) (horizontal commonality requires that investors share as
joint participants in single investment enterprise), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
20. See Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(pooling exists when multiple investors hold interests in single enterprise and investors profit
pro-rata according to success of enterprise).
21. Id.; see Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir.) (horizontal
arrangement provides interdependent success or failure of each individual investor's account),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). The Savino court offered as an example of horizontal
commonality an arrangement in which investors place funds in a single account and transactions
affect the account as a whole rather than each investor's account individually. Id. Furthermore,
the Savino court explained that the investor's realize the same profit or loss as the single large
account on a pro-rata basis of the investor's contributions to the single account. Id.
22. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir.) (horizontal
commonality necessitates pooling of funds for common purpose), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972); Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 436, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (horizontal commonality coincides each investor's success or failure to that of
all other investors within the investment enterprise).
23. See, e.g., Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d
[Vol. 41:1057
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accounts fail to satisfy the commonality requirement of the Howey test
because the one-to-one relationship prevents a pooling of funds, even when
the broker enters into identical transactions for several individual accounts.
24
In Hart v. Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp.,25 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the horizontal commonality require-
ment to a model home sale-leaseback arrangement and found that a common
enterprise did not exist. 26 In Hart, individual investors purchased twenty-
three homes from Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp. (Pulte) on the condition
that the purchasers would lease back the homes to Pulte for use as model
homes. 27 Pulte, in return, represented that it would develop the subdivisions
in which the homes were located. The investors expected to sell the homes
upon completion of the development and realize a profit from the increase
in the value of the homes brought about by Pulte's development. 2 9 Upon
failing to realize the expected profits that Pulte had represented, the investors
Cir. 1982) (discretionary trading account held not security under '33 and '34 Acts because
account was not part of pooled group of funds); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 1980) (discretionary trading account fails to qualify as
security under '33 and '34 Acts because fortunes of investors lack interdependent correlation),
aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir.
1977) (discretionary trading account fails to satisfy Howey test because each account possesses
unitary nature with independent success and failure rate); Darrel v. Goodson, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,349, at 97,325 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discretionary trading
account failed to satisfy Howey test because necessary pooling of investors' funds was absent);
cf. infra notes 43-93 and accompanying text (discussing theories of vertical commonality).
24. See, e.g.,Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977)
(identical transactions among individual discretionary trading accounts resulting in uniform
profits and losses fails to satisfy pooling of funds required for horizontal commonality);
Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,065, at 91,314 (D. Mass. 1985) (trading separate accounts in similar or identical pattern
fails to establish horizontal commonality); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp.
1225, 1236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (identical transactions of individual accounts fails to constitute
"pooling" of funds necessary to horizontal commonality); Meredith v. Conticommodity Serv.,
Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,701, at 98,671-72 (D.C. 1980) (horizon-
tal commonality requires more than incidental equivalence of profits among individual accounts
arising from identical transactions).
25. 735 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 1004-05.
27. Id. at 1002. In Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp.
(Pulte), the developer, offered to sell model homes located in 21 subdivisions around the Detroit
area. Id. at 1003. Pulte offered the homes on the condition that the purchasers lease back the
homes to Pulte for use as model homes. Id. at 1002. The investors in Hart purchased 23 homes
in 8 subdivisions and entered management leases with Pulte ranging from 18 months to two
years. Id. at 1003. Pulte represented that the leases would return rental income equal to the
annual debt service on a mortgage of 80% of the purchase price. Id. Pulte, however, retained
the right to cancel a lease if Pulte found a purchaser for a house at market value. Id.
28. Id. at 1002. In Hart, Pulte represented to investors that Pulte would develop the
subdivisions containing the homes offered for sale and, thus cause the homes to appreciate in
value. Id. at 1002.
29. Id. at 1002. Relying on Pulte's economic inducements, the Hart investors expected to
maintain a passive role and benefit solely from Pulte's development efforts. Id.
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filed suit against Pulte, alleging violations of the '33 and '34 Acts.30 In
addressing the investors' claim that the sale-leaseback arrangements consti-
tuted securities under the '33 and '34 Acts, the Hart court explained that
because the homes purchased by the individual investors were situated in
eight different subdivisions, the success of each investment was not tied to a
common development enterprise.3' The Hart court held, therefore, that the
sale-leaseback agreements failed to satisfy the Howey common enterprise
requirement.3 2 The Hart court noted in dicta, however, that horizontal
commonality did exist in a situation in which individuals had purchased lots
in a single planned subdivision because the success of each individual
investment was dependent upon the development of that one subdivision.
33
Similarly, in SEC v. Professional Associates34 the Sixth Circuit applied
the horizontal commonality standard to investment trust accounts. 5 In
Professional Associates, investment promoters offered interests in an invest-
ment trust account to individual investors. 36 The promoters circulated bro-
chures which represented that the trust would pool the investor's funds rather
than transact each account individually. 37 In determining whether the trust
accounts constituted investment contracts subject to regulation under the '33
and '34 Acts, the Sixth Circuit first established that the trust accounts
satisfied the first and third prongs of the Howey test. 38 The Sixth Circuit
30. Id. at 1002. In Hart, the purchasers of the homes alleged that Pulte's representations
were false and misleading and that the sale and lease-back arrangements constituted securities
under the '33 and '34 Acts and, therefore, necessitated registration. Id.; cf. S.E.C. v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943) (existence of security requires more than sale
of interests of land).
31. See Hart, 735 F.2d at 1004-5. The Hart court found that the Howey common
enterprise element requires a pooling of individual investor's funds to create an interdependency
of success or failure. Id. Because the success of each investor's investment was not tied to the
development of a single subdivision, the Hart court found that the requisite commonality was
absent. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (10th Cir.
1980) (recognizing that purchase of lots in single development area may satisfy Howey common
enterprise element).
34. 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 353-55.
36. Id. at 353-54.
37. Id. at 354. The promotional brochures in S.E.C. v. Professional Assoc. emphasized
the increased purchasing power that the pooling of funds within the trust would create in
comparison to the purchasing power of an individual investor. Id.
38. Id. at 354. In Professional Assoc., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
sought to enjoin the promoters from offering or selling the trust account investments, claiming
that the investments were securities and that the promoters were selling the investments in
violation of the registration and antifraud provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. at 351. The
district court granted the injunction, and the promoters appealed-to the Sixth Circuit, contending
that the district court erred in finding that the trust account investments constituted securities
under the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. The promoters, however, conceded that the trust account
investments satisfied the first prong of the Howey test, which requires the investment of money,
as well as the third prong which requires that the investor expect profits based on the efforts




then applied the horizontal commonality standard to determine whether the
trust accounts satisfied the common enterprise prong of the Howey test.
39
Although the actual trust agreements stipulated that the promoters would
manage each account on an individual basis, the Sixth Circuit looked beyond
the agreements to the economic reality of the accounts4 ° The Professional
Associates court concluded that because the promotional brochures repre-
sented a pooling of investors' funds and because the promoters, in fact, did
pool the investors' funds, the trust accounts also satisfied the horizontal
commonality standard imposed under the Howey test.
4 '
Although courts generally agree that the presence of horizontal com-
monality satisfies the Howey common enterprise requirement, some courts
adhere to a less stringent interpretation of common enterprise which requires
only a vertical relationship between the investor and the promoter or invest-
ment manager. 42 Courts applying the vertical commonality standard, how-
ever, differ in their interpretation of the type of relationship necessary to
satisfy the Howey common enterprise requirement.4 3 Some courts apply a
broad concept of vertical commonality and require only a one-to-one rela-
tionship or link between the investor and the promoter without requiring
any interdependency of fortune and success between the investor and either
the promoter or other investors. 44 Courts applying the broad approach
expressly reject the pro rata sharing of profits requirement essential to
39. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d at 354-55.
40. Id. at 354-55. In disregarding the trust agreements in favor of the actual management
of the trust accounts, the Professional Assoc. court relied on Tcherepnin v. Knight in which
the Supreme Court recognized that the' substance and economic reality of a transaction or
financial arrangement should control the determination of whether a security exists. Id. at 354;
see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text
(discussing Knight).
41. ProfessionalAssoc., 731 F.2d at 354-55. The ProfessionalAssoc. court also considered
whether a second type of trust account promising a 9% annual return and requiring only a $25
minimum deposit constituted a security. Id. at 35. The Professional Assoc. court held that the
rate of return in comparison to the minimum payment, coupled with the promotional brochure
that implied a pooling of funds, justified concluding that the second type of trust accounts
constituted securities. Id. at 354-56.
42. See Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(recognizing general acceptance of horizontal commonality as compared to less stringent vertical
commonality approaches).
43. See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting broad view
of vertical commonality); infra notes 57-92 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting
narrow view of vertical commonality).
44. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 527 (5th Cir.
1974) (requisite commonality for Howey test exists when investor's return depends upon
promoter's efforts and expertise); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) (one-to-one relationship satisfies common enterprise element of Howey test); Alvord
v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 848, 853 (D. Conn. 1980) (common enterprise
requires only one-to-one relationship between investor and investment manager); Troyer v.
Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (one-to-one relationship between investor
and investment manager creates common enterprise).
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horizontal commonality45 and, instead, focus on whether the fortune and
success of the investor depends ultimately on the efforts and skill of the
promoter Or investment manager.46 As a reSult, courts following the broad
approach to vertical commonality consistently have found that any discre-
tionary brokerage account satisfies the common enterprise element of the
Howey test.
4 7
The application of the broad concept of vertical commonality, however,
extends beyond investor-broker relationships, as evidenced by McList v.
Harris Farms, Inc..48 fn McLish, the District Court for the Eastern District
of California applied a broad concept of vertical commonality to determine
whether a cattle feedlot operation satisfied the Howey common enterprise
requirement.49 In McLish, Harris Farms, Inc. (Harris Farms), the promoter,
financed,, purchased, and cared for cattle in feedlots owned and operated by
Harris Farms.50 The purchaser/investor, McLish, entered into a contract
with Harris Farms whereby Harris Farms would purchase and feed cattle for
McLish until the cattle were fattened and ready to market."1 Harris Farms
purchased and managed the desired amount of cattle and, subsequently,
marketed and sold the cattle or behalf of McLish.5 2 The override on feed
and interest, in addition; to the general management fee, represented the
45. See" S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (pro-rata
sharing of profits is not essential to finding commonality under Howey test); Alvord v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F. Supp, 848, 853 (D. Conn. 1980) (commonality exists without pro-
rata sharing of profits).
46. See; e.g., S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974)
(requisite commonality of Howey test merely requires interdependency of investor's success and
efforts of promoter); S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.
1974 (critical inquiry in commonality determination is whether success of investment depends
upon promoter's expertise).
47. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 597 F.2d 516, 519-22 (5th Cir.
1974) (discretionary trading accounts satisfy Howey test); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F.
Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (discretionary securities and commodities trading accounts
constitute securities under '33 and '34 Acts); Alvord v, Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F.
Supp. 84&, 853 (D. Conn. 1980) (discretionary stock option trading account constitutes security
under '33 and '34 Acts); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discre-
tionary securities trading accounts constitute investment contracts).
48. 507 F. Supp, 1075 (ED, Cal. 1980).
49. Rd. at 1080-85.
50. Id. at 1076-79.
51. Id, at 1077-79. In McLish v. Harris Farms, Inc., a feedlot operator, Harris Farms,
Inc. (Harris Farms), performed services for its customers such as locating, financing, purchasing,
and arranging transportation for cattle to the feedlot. Id. at 1078. In addition, Harris Farms
constantly monitored the cattle at the feedlot to insure that the cattle remained healthy and that
the feeding process continued in an efficient manner. Id. at 1077, 1088-89. Furthermore, the
purchaser/investor in McLish relied on Harris Farms' efforts and skills in determining when to
sell the cattle and in procuring a subsequent purchaser of the cattle. Id. at 1078-80, 1084.
52, Id. at 78-80. In McLish, Harris Farms retained the authority to determine when the
-cattle were fattened and ready to sell. Id. at 1085. The dispute in McLish arose out of
disagreements between the purchaser/investor and Harris Farms concerning the manner in which
Harris Farms conducted the selling process. Id.
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benefit to Harris Farms. 3 McLish, on the other hand, would profit only if
the price of cattle rose between the purchase and sale date.4
In determining whether the feedlot venture was a security under the '33
Act, the McLish court held that although Harris Farms benefited regardless
of whether McLish received a profit from the enterprise, the venture consti-
tuted an investment contract because the investor relied on the expertise and
efforts of Harris Farms in caring for and marketing the cattle to generate
potential profits.55 McLish, accordingly, evinces an acceptance of the broad
concept of vertical commonality in finding that the feedlot venture qualified
as an investment contract, despite the lack of any interdependency of success
between McLish and either other investors or the promoter, Harris Farms.
5 6
In contrast to the liberal concept of vertical commonality which the Fifth
Circuit and various lower courts have adopted, other courts apply a more
narrow interpretation of vertical commonality.17 Under the narrow concept
53. Id. at 1083; see id. at 1077 (Harris Farms benefitted solely from keeping feedlots full
of customer cattle).
54. See id. at 1083, 1077-78. In addition to any expectation of profits, McLish also
expected to receive significant tax benefits from the feedlot venture. Id.
55. Id. at 1083-84. In McLish, McLish was dissatisfied with the procedure through which
Harris Farms marketed and sold McLish's cattle. Id. at 1078-80. McLish filed suit against
Harris Farms to recover the losses incurred in selling the cattle, alleging that the feedlot venture
was a security under the '33 Act and that Harris Farms' failure to file a registration statement
violated the '33 Act. Id. at 1075; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) ('33 Act requires filing of
registration statement in connection with sale of security). The McLish court, in line with the
broad view of commonality, emphasized that McLish relied on the efforts of Harris Farms to
effectuate a successful transaction. McLish, 507 F. Supp. at 1075; see supra note 46 and
accompanying text (broad view of vertical commonality focuses on whether efforts and skill of
promoter determine success or failure of enterprise). The McLish court, accordingly, determined
that Harris Farms provided the managerial skills essential to the failure or success of the
enterprise and that the requisite commonality thereby was satisfied. McLish, 507 F. Supp. at
1083-85; see id. at 1088-90 (discussing responsibilities and managerial functions of Harris
Farms).
56. See McLish, 507 F. Supp. at 1079-85 (feedlot venture in McLish constituted investment
contract); supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (broad concept of vertical commonality
requires only one-to-one relationship with expectation of success from efforts of promoter); cf.
supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (horizontal commonality requires pooling of investors'
funds); infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (narrow concept of vertical commonality
requires some degree of commonality of success and failure between investor and promoter).
57. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 484 n.7 (9th Cir.)
(common enterprise requires interdependency of success between investor and either third party
or other investor), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Meyer v. Thomas & McKinnon Auchincloss
Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1982) (discretionary trading account not investment
contract because broker received commission regardless of account's profitability), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1023 (1983); Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (vertical
commonality mandates interdependency between investor and promoter without requiring
involvement of multiple investors); Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.,
618 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (common enterprise requires interrelation of fortunes
of members); Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 1425-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(acknowledging different concepts of vertical commonality); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,
507 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (vertical relationship that entails interweaving of suc-
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of vertical commonality, courts require at least some degree of interdepen-
dency between the fortune and success of the investor and either the promoter
or other investors. 8 Courts applying the narrow concept, however, do not
cess between promoter and investor presents acceptable common enterprise structure); Meredith
v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,701, at
98,670-72 (D.C. 1980) (recognizing distinction of commonality views applied by courts); Securities
Investor Protection v. Associated Underwriters, 423 F. Supp. 168, 178 (D. Utah 1975) (interrela-
tionship between investor and promoter creates common enterprise).
58. See S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 481-82 & n.7 (9th Cir.) (vertical
commonality exists when success or failure of investor correlates with success or failure of
either third party or other investors), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see also Brodt v. Bache
& Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (vertical commonality requires at least some correlation
of investors and investment manager's success); Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (common enterprise demands some degree
of correlation of members' fortunes); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225,
1235-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing distinction between horizontal and vertical commonality
approaches); Meredity v. Conticommodity Service, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,701 at 98,670-72 (D.C. 1980) (acknowledging various approaches to common
enterprise inquiry); supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text (discussing horizontal commonality
approach).
S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises is the landmark case that established the narrow
concept of vertical commonality. See Turner, 474 F.2d at 481-82 & n.7; see also Brodt, 595
F.2d at 460 (adopting Turner definition of common enterprise); Savino v. E.F. Hutton, 507 F.
Supp. 1225, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing impact of Turner). In Turner, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether a pyramid scheme requiring minor efforts from investors, but ultimately
dependent upon the promoters for success, constituted an investment contract under Howey.
Turner, 474 F.2d at 480-83. The pyramid scheme in Turner involved a scam arrangement
whereby purchasers of interests in the enterprise received self-motivation packets. Id. at 478.
Based on the status of the purchasers, which depended upon the purchase price of the interest,
the purchasers performed various skills at conventions held by the enterprise to induce new
prospects to purchase an interest. Id. at 478-79. High level purchasers, or those who invested
the greater amounts of money, became salesmen and received a percentage of sales income
from the enterprise according to the number of sales the individual purchaser consummated.
Id. at 478. Horizontal commonality did not exist under the scheme because each investor/
purchaser profited on an individual basis pro-rata with the enterprise. Id. In considering whether
the pyramid scheme transactions constituted a security, the Turner court found that a common
enterprise existed between purchasers sharing pro-rata in income with the enterprise because the
success of the individual investor/purchaser was interwoven with and dependent upon the
success of the enterprise. Id. at 481-82 & n.7. Since Turner, many courts have adopted the
narrow concept of vertical commonality as the standard by which to judge the existence of a
common enterprise, recognizing that the rigid pooling requirement of the horizontal concept is
too strict a standard. See Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871
(D. Utah 1981) (courts should not penalize investor simply because he is alone in his misfortunes);
supra note 57 (identifying courts that have adopted narrow concept of vertical commonality).
At least one court expressly has stated that the requisite commonality for the narrow
concept of vertical commonality requires not only that the fortunes of investor and promoter
must rise together, but also that the fortunes must fall together. See Michigan v. Art Capital
Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (relying on Savino in explaining narrow
concept of vertical commonality); see also Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1237 (vertical commonality
exists when fortunes of investor and investment manager rise and fall together). The contention
that the fortunes must fall together, however, appears irrelevant to the existence of a common
enterprise because the relevant inquiry remains whether some degree of commonality exists. See
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require strict interdependency among multiple investors as the horizontal
approach demands. 9 In essence, courts adhering to the narrow concept of
vertical commonality require that only some degree of correlation between
the fortunes of the members of a venture exist to create a "common"
enterprise. 6° The correlation, however, need not entail a pooling of investors'
funds. 6' Under the narrow vertical commonality approach, therefore, a one-
to-one relationship between an investor and a promoter or investment
manager may satisfy the Howey common enterprise requirement, provided
that a requisite correlation of success or failure between the two parties
exists. 62 For example, in Brodt v. Bache & Co., 63 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a discretionary trading account constituted an investment contract
under the Howey test. 64 In Brodt, representatives of Bache & Co., an
investment brokerage firm, maintained discretionary authority to trade with
funds from an investor's account and collected a commission on each
transaction regardless of the overall success of the account.65 Applying the
Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1237 (stating that investor and investment manager's fortunes must rise
and fall together, but holding that discretionary trading account constitutes investment contract
because broker received 10% commission on profits of account); Silverstein, 518 F. Supp. at
439 (essential element of common enterprise is direct relation between fortunes of enterprise
members); Morduant v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (direct relationship between
success or failure of members of enterprise must exist to create "common" enterprise).
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing vertical concept of commonality);
cf. supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text (discussing horizontal commonality).
60. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 599 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (common enterprise
requires correlation of profit and loss among participants); Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (correlation of fortunes between
enterprise members constitutes essential element of common enterprise); supra note 58 and
accompanying text (vertical commonality requires interdependency of enterprise members'
fortunes).
61. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978) (vertical commonality
exists without presence of multiple investors in venture); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168, 178 (D. Utah 1975) (vertical commonality
alleviates pooling of funds requirement from common enterprise); supra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text (discussing narrow view of vertical commonality).
62. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (vertical commonality
requires investor and promoter commonality without necessitating involvement of other inves-
tors); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Utah 1981)
(purpose of vertical commonality is to not deny protection of securities laws to single investor
solely because of absence of co-investors); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp.
1225, 1237-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (individual investors trading accounts comprise common enter-
prise when interdependency of investor's and broker's fortunes exists).
63. 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 460-62. In Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., an employee of Bache & Co. induced
one of the plaintiffs, Robert T. Brodt, to open a discretionary commodities futures account
with Bache & Co. Id. at 460. The Bache employee represented that the investments would reap
large economic profits and Brodt's resulting account allowed employees of Bache & Co. to
trade with the funds at the employees' discretion. Id. Bache & Co. lost all of Brodt's invested
money and the company through which Bache & Co. had purchased the futures became
insolvent. Id. at 460. Brodt subsequently filed suit claiming that Bache & Co. had violated the
'33 and '34 Acts. Id.
65. Id. at 460.
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narrow vertical commonality approach to determine whether the trading
account created a common enterprise under the Howey test, the Brodt court
held that the account failed to satisfy the common enterprise requirement of
the Howey test because the brokers profited by commissions based solely on
the frequency of account transactions, rather than on the profitability of the
account.- In comparison, the district court for the Southern District of New
York in Savino v. E.F Hutton & Co. 6 adopted the narrow concept of
vertical commonality in finding that a discretionary trading account satisfied
the common enterprise requirement of the Howey test.s The Savino court
explained that because the broker in Savino took a bonus of ten percent of
the account's profit, the success of the investor and of the broker were
interdependent and, accordingly, satisfied the narrow concept of vertical
commonality.
69
The Tenth Circuit recently adopted the narrow concept of vertical
commonality, holding in McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co.70 that
a joint venture of two equal partners, an investor and a developer, created
a common enterprise under the Howey test.7' In McGill, Joe Vance, a
representative of defendant Commercial Funding Corporation (Commercial),
approached Gene McGill regarding a real estate venture. 72 Vance sought to
induce McGill to invest $80,000 in a joint venture with Commercial for the
purpose of developing a residential subdivision. 3 Vance represented the
66. Id. at 461-62. The Ninth Circuit in Brodt expressly rejected the horizontal approach
of commonality as well as the broad vertical approach, explaining that merely providing
investment counseling does not constitute a common enterprise. Id. In addition to finding that
the existing investor-broker relationship failed to fall within the narrow concept of commonality,
the Brodt court explained that the investor did not share his profits and the financial success
of the investor was unrelated to the financial success of the broker. Id. at 462.
67, 507 F.2d 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
68. Id. at 1237-9. The plaintiffs in Savino v. EF. Hutton & Co., Inc., the Savinos,
maintained discretionary trading accounts with defendant E.F. Hutton & Co. (E.F. Hutton).
Id. at 1228-29. Under the account agreements in Savino, E.F. Hutton received 10% of the
accounts' profits as a bonus. Id. at 1230, 1239. E.F. Hutton failed to disclose information
concerning the financial situation of the Savino accounts, and the Savinos filed suit claiming
violations of the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. at 1228-31. In determining whether the Savino accounts
constituted securities under the '33 and '34 Acts, the Savino court applied the Howey test. Id.
at 1235-39. The Savino court first found that the accounts failed to satisfy the horizontal
concept of common enterprise because E.F. Hutton treated the funds of each separate account
on an individual basis, rather than pooling the funds into a single account. Id. at 1236-37. The
Savino court explained, however, that the absence of horizontal commonality did not preclude
the existence of a common enterprise. Id. at 1237. The Savino court then applied the narrow
concept of vertical commonality and determined that each individual account created a common
enterprise between the investor and E. Hutton. Id. at 1237-39.
69. Id. at 1239. The SavinO court explained that a one-to-one relationship creates a
common enterprise when an interdependency between the profits and losses of the two parties
exists. Id. at 1238,
70. 776 E,2d 923 (10th Cir 1985).
71. Id. at 925-26.
'72 Md. at 923-24.
'73. Id. at 924.
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investment as "sure-fire" and "risk free" on the basis that American Land
& Exploration Company (American), a codefendant, had agreed to purchase
all of the lots in the subdivision after the completion of certain agreed upon
improvements by the joint venture. 74 McGill invested the $80,000 with the
expectation of sharing in the operating profits generated by the joint ven-
ture." Commercial, however, failed to develop the subdivision, and, as a
result, the joint venture never became active.76 McGill filed a civil suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against
Commercial, American, and various promoters, including Vance, claiming
that the defendants misrepresented material facts concerning the joint venture
in violation of the '33 and '34 Acts. 77 Applying the Howey test, the district
court considered whether the joint venture constituted an investment con-
tract.7 The district court adopted the horizontal concept of commonality
and found that the vertical relationship between a single investor and a
promoter failed to satisfy the common enterprise requirement of the Howey
test.7 9 The district court subsequently dismissed all of McGill's claims. 0
McGill appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. 81
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the joint venture
between McGill and the defendants provided the commonality necessary to
74. Id. In McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., the promoters provided written
representation to the plaintiff, Gene McGill, that American Land & Exploration Co. had agreed
to purchase lots in the proposed subdivision from the joint venture after the joint venture
completed certain developments, including water, sewer, and street installation. Id.; see Brief
for Appellant at 3, McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The agreed upon purchase price for each lot was
$9,800. 776 F.2d at 924.
75. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924-25. In McGill, McGill expected to receive one-half of the
operating profits plus his original investment upon the liquidation of the joint venture. Id. at
925.
76. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924. In McGill, after McGill invested $80,000 in the joint venture
the defendants made no progress in developing the proposed subdivision. Id.; Brief for
Appellant, supra note 74, at 4. In explaining the delay in progress to McGill, the defendants
misrepresented that replatting and bureaucratic delays were responsible for slowing the progress
when, in fact, certain contractors that had performed work on the project had not been paid.
Brief for appellant, at 4.
77. 776 F.2d at 924. In McGill, in addition to alleging violations of the '33 and '34 Acts,
McGill also claimed that the misrepresentations violated rule l0b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, and various
Oklahoma statutes. See id. at 925; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (S.E.C. rule lOb-5); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) (RICO).
78. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924; see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing
Howey test); infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decision in
Howey).
79. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
80. Id. Upon determining that the McGill transaction did not constitute a security, the
McGill district court dismissed all of McGill's claims without considering any further evidence.
Id.
81. Id. at 923.
19861 1071
1072 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
satisfy the Howey common enterprise requirement.12 The Tenth Circuit
initially recognized that several other circuits adhere to the rigid horizontal
commonality requirement. 83 The Tenth Circuit observed, however, that the
Howey opinion contemplates a judicial application of the Howey doctrine
based on the economic reality of the transaction.8 4 In light of Howey's
emphasis on economic reality, the McGill court stated that the correct
common enterprise test should consider whether the transaction is purely
commercial in nature or, in reality, an investment. 5 The Tenth Circuit
explained that when the economic reality of a transaction indicates that the
transaction is an investment, the transaction creates a common enterprise
and qualifies as a "security" under the Howey test, regardless of whether
horizontal commonality exists.
86
Applying the economic reality rationale to the McGill joint venture, the
Tenth Circuit found that because McGill invested money with the expectation
of obtaining a return based on the joint venture's operating profits, rather
than from capital appreciation, the transaction constituted an investment. 7
The Tenth Circuit distinguished a commercial transaction as providing a
specified rate of return and an absence of any right to participate in the
operation profits derived from the transaction. 88 Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit found that because McGill expected to share in the joint venture's
operating profits with Commercial, the joint venture constituted a common
enterprise.8 9 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the joint venture
investment scheme satisfied the common enterprise requirement of the Howey
test.9 In support of the McGill holding, the Tenth Circuit stated that a lack
82. Id. at 924.
83. Id. at 924. See generally Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 682
F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982) (following horizontal commonality requirement); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); see also supra
notes 18-42 and accompanying text (discussing horizontal commonality requirement).
84. See id. at 925. The McGill court relied on the clarification of the Howey test announced
in Tcherepnin v. Knight to emphasize the economic reality of a transaction over the rigid
horizontal commonality requirement. Id.; see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)
(Howey requires substance over form analysis with emphasis on economic reality); infra notes
123-29 and accompanying text (discussing Knight).
85. McGill, 776 F.2d at 925.
86. See id. at 925-26 (McGill Court found one-to-one vertical relationship between investor
and promoter satisfies Howey test).
87. Id. at 925.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 925-26.
90. Id. at 926. Although the McGill joint venture satisfied the common enterprise
requirement of the Howey test, joint venture and general partnership interests generally do not
constitute a security under the '33 and '34 Acts because these types of interests often entail the
exercise of extensive control over the profit and loss potential of the enterprise by the investors
and, thus, violate the third prong of the Howey test. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730
F.2d 99, 102-04 (3d Cir.) (general partnership interest held not security under Howey test
because general partner possesses right to exercise extensive control in partnership matters),
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of horizontal commonality cannot obscure the economic reality of a trans-
action or bar the existence of a common enterprise under the Howey test.9'
Although the McGill court did not adopt expressly the narrow concept of
vertical commonality, the court's emphasis on McGill and Commercial's
interdependency of success appears to evince an endorsement of the narrow
view of vertical commonality. 92
Although a split of authority exists among the lower courts concerning
whether a common enterprise requires horizontal or a form of vertical
commonality, the Supreme Court expressly has declined to decide the issue.93
Moreover, in those cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the
substance over form analysis embodied in the Howey test and found that an
investment contract existed, horizontal commonality appears to have been
present. 94 The Supreme Court has declined, however, to state specifically
that a common enterprise requires horizontal commonality, as opposed to
only vertical commonality.95 Rather, the decisions in which the Supreme
Court has considered the existence of an investment contract emphasize the
economic reality of the transaction and the congressional intent to construe
the definition of a security in a broad sense to include as wide an array of
proposed profit seeking activities in the commercial setting as possible.
96
For example, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corporation,9 7 the Supreme
Court's first attempt to define an investment contract, the Court considered
whether assignments of oil leases for the purpose of financing the drilling of
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 1982) (general
partnership interests generally do not constitute securities under '33 and '34 Acts because general
partners retain right to control significant partnership decisions), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1188
(1983); Oxford Finance Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 432-35 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (joint venture
held not security under '33 and '34 Acts because joint venture agreement required that both
venturers must consent to all management decisions); see also Darrah v. Garret, [1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,472, at 93,364-65 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (limited partnership
interest held not security under '33 and '34 Acts because limited partners retained extensive con-
trol over profit and loss potential of partnership).
91. McGill, 776 F.2d at 926.
92. See id. The McGill court directly linked McGill's expectation of sharing in the
operating profits of the joint venture to the court's holding that the joint venture qualified as
a common enterprise. Id.
93. See Morduant v. Incomco, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985) (declining to address Howey
commonality issue).
94. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1974) (savings and loan pooled investors'
funds as working capital); S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1949) (promoter pooled
investors' funds to benefit promoter's citrus enterprise); S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943) (promoter pooled investors' funds to finance proposed drilling of oil well);
see also infra notes 97-159 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's application of
economic reality theory embodied in Howey opinion).
95. See infra notes 97-159 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's treatment
of Howey economic reality rationale).
96. Id.; see 1933 HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 11 (Congress intended '33 and '34 Acts
to regulate wide range of instruments within the ordinary concept of security).
97. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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a test well constituted investment contracts under the '33 Act.9 8 In Joiner,
the promoter, Joiner Leasing Corporation (Joiner Leasing), sought multiple
investors to purchase leaseholds surrounding a proposed drilling site."9 The
promoters represented the leases as providing an opportunity for "splendid
returns" and assured the investors that Joiner Leasing would complete a test
well to determine the oil producing capacity of the leaseholds.100 The investors
relied on both the economic inducements of Joiner Leasing in purchasing
the leaseholds, and the proposed efforts of Joiner Leasing's drilling of a test
well to provide the expected returns) 0' Joiner Leasing's venture embodied
horizontal commonality because, as the Joiner Court recognized, the fortunes
of the holders of the leaseholds depended on the overall success of the
exploration enterprise into which Joiner Leasing purportedly had pooled the
investors' funds02c Relying on the character of the lease assignments in
commerce as established by Joiner Leasing's offering, the Joiner Court
found that the leaseholds constituted investment contracts 03 The Joiner
Court emphasized that the economic reality of the leasehold offerings as
represented to the investors should control the existence of an investment
contract.' 4 In addition, the Joiner Court recognized that by including such
catch-all phrases as "investment contract" and "instruments commonly
98. Id. at 345-46. In Joiner, the owners of a parcel of land granted leases to a promoter,
Joiner Leasing Corporation (Joiner Leasing), on the understanding that Joiner Leasing would
drill a test well. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 346 & n.3. In Joiner, Joiner Leasing mnailed sales campaigns to approximately
1,000 people throughout the several states in an effort to attract investors. d. at 346. The sales
literature contained the terms of -the leases offered and insured the prospective investors that
Joiner Leasing would complete the test well. Id. at 346. In addition, the literature contained
optimistic opinions regarding the potential success of the venture. Id. at 346 n.3.
101. Id. at 347-49, The Joiner Court emphasized that the presence of the economic
inducements in Joiner Leasing's offer distinguished the offer from that of an ordinary leasehold.
Id. at 348.
102. Id. at 348. Jn Joiner, Joiner Leasing represented to prospective investors that Joiner
Leasing would employ the money received from the investors to drill a test well. Id. at 346.
The investors purchased leaseholds surrounding the proposed drilling site and expected to profit
from the increase in the value of the leaseholds based upon the success of the drilling enterprise.
Id. at 346-48. Absent the drilling of the test well, the leases possessed virtually no value. Id. at
349. The success of all of the investors in Joiner, therefore, depended upon the success of the
drilling enterprise as a whole. Id.
103. Id. at 349-53. In Joiner, the Court recognized that Joiner Leasing's offerings embodied
not only a lease, but also a development project. Id. at 349. The Joiner Court then explained
that because the development project was the sole reason for Joiner Leasing's offering the
leaseholds and because the drilling enterprise provided the incentive and value of the offerings,
the leaseholds constituted investment contracts. Id. Supporting the conclusion that the leaseholds
constituted investment contracts, the Joiner Court noted that courts should apply a flexible
interpretation to descriptive terms such as "investment contract," consistent with the economic
character of the instrument in question. d. at 351. The Joiner court further explained that the
economic, or commercial, character of an instrument depends on the "terms of the offer, the
plan of distribution, and the -economic inducements" as represented to prospective investors.
Id. at 353.
104. Id. at 352-53; seesupra note 103 (discussing Joiner's approach to economic reality).
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known as a security" in the '33 Act's definition of a security, 05 Congress
intended the application of the '33 Act to extend beyond the obvious and
commonplace and to reach all instruments that possess the character of a
security in the commercial setting.13 6
Three years after deciding Joiner, the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.'07 refined the "character in commerce" definition of an invest-
ment contract.1 0s In Howey, the promoter, Howey Company (Howey Co.),
owned large tracts of citrus acreage in Florida.' 9 Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc., (Hills) cultivated and developed many of Howey Co.'s groves."10 In an
effort to finance additional development, Howey Co. offered approximately
one-half of the citrus acreage to the public."' Howey Co. provided to each
prospective customer both a land sales contract and a service contract,
advising each prospect that to invest in a grove would not be feasible unless
service arrangements were made." 2 Howey Co. stressed the superiority of
Hills, and, as a result, Hills obtained contracts covering eighty-five percent
of the acreage sold during a three year period.'
Although the land sales contracts conveyed a specific plot of land to
each purchaser," 4 small land marks distinguishable only through a plat
record book provided the sole means of dividing the tracts."5 In addition,
under the service contracts the owners of the land possessed no right to the
fruit produced by the trees on their individual plats of land." 6 Instead,
Howey Co. and Hills would pool all the harvested fruit and allocate the pro-
fits attributable to each tract to the owner based on a "check" made at the
time of picking.'7 Horizontal commonality appears present in the Howey
scheme because Howey Co. pooled the investors' funds in the Howey Co.
citrus enterprise.'
105. See supra note 7 (text of '33 and '34 Acts' definition of "security").
106. Id. at 341; see I L. Loss, SEcurmEs REoULATIONS 483-511 (2d ed. 1961) (courts have
employed "investment contract" as "catch-all" phrase).
107. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
108. Id. at 298-301.
109. Id. at 295.
110. Id. In S.F.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., W.J. Howey Co. (Howey Co.) and Howey-in-the-
Hills Service, Inc. (Hills) were corporations under common control and management. Id.
111. Id. In Howey, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that Howey
Co. violated the registration requirements of § 5(a) of the '33 Act. Id. at 293-94; see 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(eXA) (1982) (section 5(a) of '33 Act prohibits sale of unregistered securities).
112. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295.
113. Id. In Howey, the service contracts gave Hills a leasehold interest and full possession
rights to the citrus acreage purchased by the investor. Id. at 296. Under the service contract in
Howey, Hills applied its expertise in the citrus enterprise and managed and marketed the crops
for a specified fee. Id.
114. See id. at 295. The tract of citrus acreage offered in Howey consisted of narrow strips
of land containing a row of 48 trees. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 296.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 295-96. The Howey scheme entailed the use of funds obtained from the
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Considering whether the transactions between the investors' and Howey
Co. were securities under the '33 and '34 Acts, the Howey Court held that
the transactions constituted investment contracts because the presence of the
service contracts suggested that the purchasers actually invested money in a
common enterprise with the expectation of sharing in the profits derived
solely from the efforts of others-Howey Co. and Hills." 9 The Howey
Court, however, declined to rule on the question of whether a single sales/
service contract transaction, possessing only vertical commonality, would
satisfy the common enterprise element of the Howey test. 20 On the contrary,
the Howey Court emphasized that the economic reality of a transaction
should control the determination of whether a transaction is an investment
contract under the '33 Act.'2 ' The Howey Court explained that the economic
reality approach embodies a flexible principle to facilitate the congressional
intent that the '33 Act apply to the numerous schemes devised by individuals
seeking profit for themselves through the use of others' money.,22
The Supreme Court extended the application of the Howey economic
reality test to the '34 Act in Tcherepnin v. Knight.123 In Knight, individual
investors held withdrawable capital shares in City Savings Association of
Chicago (City Savings), a state chartered savings and loan association.124 The
investors received dividends on the shares based on City Savings' profits
rather than a fixed rate of return. 2 In determining whether the capital
shares were securities under the '34 Act, the Knight Court found specifically
that the investors' participation in City Savings' moneylending operation
constituted a common enterprise dependent on the skill and efforts of the
promoter, City Savings, for success and profitability. 26 The Knight Court
multiple investors for the overall development of Howey Co.'s citrus operation which produced
the investor's return. See id.
119. Id. at 298-301. In Howey, the sales/service contracts offered by Howey Co. were not
registered pursuant to the '33 Act. Id. at 294. The SEC, alleging that the sales/service contracts
were securities, filed suit to enjoin Howey Co. from using the United States mail or instruments
of interstate commerce in connection with the offer and sale of unregistered securities in
violation of the '33 Act. Id. at 293-95; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) ('33 Act prohibits use of
interstate commerce or United States mail in connection with offer or sale of unregistered
securities); see also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974)
(relaxing Howey requiremente that investors expect profits solely from the efforts of others);
supra note 15 (discussing relaxed standard of Howey expectation of profits standard).
120. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-301.
121. Id. at 298-99.
122. Id.
123. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
124. Id. at 332-33.
125. Id. at 337. In addition to providing a dividend return, the capital shares in Knight
granted to each holder of a share both membership status and voting rights in City Savings.
Id.
126. Id. at 338. In Knight, the plaintiff investors filed suit against City Savings, claiming
that the withdrawable capital shares were securities and that City Savings had violated § 10(b)
and SEC rule lOb-5 of the '34 Act by including false and misleading statements regarding City
Savings' financial stability in printed solicitations sent to investors regarding the purchase of
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then found that the withdrawable capital shares constituted investment
contracts under the Howey test.127 Horizontal commonality existed in Knight
by virtue of City Savings pooling of the investors' funds as working capital
and the correlation between the investors' return and City Savings' profits.,28
In Knight, however, the Court once again failed to address the requisite
commonality of a common enterprise and, instead, reiterated the premise
that courts should accommodate the flexible interpretation of "security"
that Congress intended by focusing on the economic reality when determining
whether a transaction constitutes a security within the meaning of the '33 and
'34 Acts.' 29
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Howey substance over form analysis
in United Housing Foundation v. Forman130 in determining whether shares
of "stock" in a housing co-op constituted an investment contract under the
Howey test.' In Forman, a state-subsidized housing cooperative required
prospective tenants to purchase shares labeled "stock" as a prerequisite to
obtaining an apartment in the complex. 32 The shares carried no voting rights,
capital shares. Id. at 333-34; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (section 10(b) of '34 Act prohibiting
use of deceptive devices in connection with purchase or sale of security); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1985) (SEC rule lob-5 requiring full and honest disclosure in connection with purchase or
sale of any security). The investors, consequently, sought to rescind the sales of the capital
shares under § 29(b) of the '34 Act. Knight, 389 U.S. at 332; see 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982)
(contract made in violation of any provision of '34 Act is void). Addressing the investors' claim
that the capital shares were securities under the '34 Act, the Knight Court determined the shares
most closely resembled investment contracts and, accordingly, applied the rationale of the
Howey test to determine whether an investment contract actually existed. Knight, 389 U.S. at
336; see supra note 7 ('34 Act definition of security contains investment contract); supra notes
12-15 and accompanying text (discussing Howey test); see also infra note 128 and accompanying
text (discussing Knight's finding that common enterprise existed between investors and City
Savings).
127. Knight, 389 U.S. at 339. The Knight court also relied on S.E.C v. C.M. Joiner Corp.
in finding that not only did the withdrawable capital shares satisfy the Howey test as an
investment contract, but that the shares could also qualify as a security under the '34 Act as
"certificates of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," as "stock," or as
"transferable shares." See id. at 339; S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)
(instrument may qualify as security if instrument, on its face, falls within term listed in '34
Act's definition of security); supra note 7 ('34 Act's definition of "security"). But see United
Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850-58 (1974) (applying Howey economic reality test
to certificates labeled as "stock"); infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (discussing
Forman); cf. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2304-06 (1985) (limiting
Forman); infra notes 139-59 and accompanying text (discussing Landreth).
128. Knight, 389 U.S. at 337-39. The Knight Court concluded that a common enterprise
existed on the basis that City Savings pooled the investors funds as working capital and each
investor's success depended on the overall success of City Savings' money lending enterprise.
See id.; see also supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of horizontal
commonality).
129. Knight, 389 U.S. at 338 & n.19; 1933 House REPORT, supra note 8, at 11 (Congress
intended broad interpretation of term "security").
130. 421 U.S. 837 (1974).
131. Id. at 851-58.
132. Id. at 842. In Fonman, prospective tenants were required to purchase 18 shares of
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and the holders of the shares could not transfer the shares to nontenants, or
pledge or encumber the shares. 3 3 In addition, if a tenant wished, or was
forced, to vacate the dwelling, the occupancy agreement required the tenant
to offer the shares back to the co-op at the original purchase price.
134
In considering whether the shares constituted securities under the '33
and '34 Acts, the Forman Court emphasized the need to favor substance
over form and to apply the economic reality theory developed in Howey to
effectuate Congress' intended application of the '33 and '34 Acts. 3 The
Forman Court then followed the substance over form analysis and found
that the economic reality of the transactions revealed that the primary
purpose of purchasing the shares was to acquire housing for personal use
rather than to pursue profits from the efforts of others. 136 Accordingly, the
Forman Court held that the shares did not constitute investment contracts
under the Howey test. 3 7 Having found that the transactions failed to satisfy
the third prong of the Howey test, the Forman Court did not address the
Howey commonality issue even though the housing arrangement in Forman
entailed a form of horizontal commonality between the tenants and the
cooperative enterprise. '3
Primarily in response to the confusion created among the lower courts
regarding the application of Howey in the wake of Forman, the Supreme
Court recently considered the application of the Howey test in Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth.1'9 Although the Supreme Court in Landreth once
again failed to clarify the commonality required for a common enterprise to
exist, the Landreth Court's discussion of the Howey test lends insight into
stock in the housing co-op for each room desired. Id. The purchasers of the shares, however,
did not acquire the right to obtain legal title to an apartment, but merely gained the right to
occupy the dwelling. Id. at 842 & n.4.
133. Id. at 842. In addition to the alienation restrictions placed on the Forman shares, the
shares descended with the apartment only to a surviving spouse. Id.
134. Id. The purchase price for each share in Forman was $25. Id. At the time the Forman
suit was brought, all tenants that had vacated the co-op apartments had received back the initial
payment for the shares in full. Id. at 842 n.6. In the event that the co-op refused to refund the
vacating tenants purchase price, however, restrictions continued to prevent the tenant from
selling the shares for more than the initial purchase price plus a percentage of the retired
mortgage. Id. at 842-43. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed eligibility requirements on
prospective purchasers of the shares. Id. at 843.
135. Id. at 853-85.
136. See id. at 853 (relying on Howey in concluding that when transaction involves
acquisitions for personal use or consumption, securities laws do not apply). In addition to
finding that the shares failed to constitute investment contracts, the Forman Court also found
that because the shares failed to possess characteristics generally associated with stocks, the
shares were not securities under the '33 and '34 Acts by virtue of the label "stock." Id. at 848-
50.
137. See id. at 853 (relying on Howey to conclude that when transaction involves acquisi-
tions for personal use, securities laws do not apply).
138. See 421 U.S. 837 (1974) (Forman Court's reasoning failed to necessitate discussion of
commonality requirement of Howey test).
139. 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
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the intended application of the Howey test and, hence, the requisite com-
monality." 0° In Landreth, the respondents sold one-hundred percent of the
stock of their timber business (the "Mill") to multiple investors.' 4' The
purchasers of the stock formed Landreth Timber Company, the petitioner.'42
When the Mill failed to live up to the purchasers' expectations, the petitioner
filed suit alleging violations of the '33 and '34 Acts and seeking to rescind
the sale of the stock.' 43 The respondents claimed that under the "sale of
business doctrine,"'' the stock purchased did not constitute a security within
the meaning of the '33 and '34 Acts. 45 The respondents argued that Forman
instructs courts, in every instance, to apply the economic reality analysis
embodied in the Howey test to determine whether a transaction constitutes
a security under the '33 and '34 Acts.' 46
In determining whether the stock constituted a security under the '33
and '34 Acts, the Landreth Court first recognized the general rule that the
language of the '33 and '34 Acts controls the determination of whether an
instrument or transaction constitutes a security under the '33 and '34 Acts. 47
140. See id. at 2304-06 (discussing application of Howey test).
141. Id. at 2299.
142. Id.
143. Id. In Landreth, the purchasers of the respondents' timber business stock alleged that
the respondents had offered and sold the stock without registering the stock pursuant to the
'33 Act, and that the respondents had failed to disclose fully all material information concerning
the timber business in violation of the '34 Act. Id. at 2301; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) & (c) (1982)
(registration requirements of '33 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (prohibiting deceptive activity in
connection with sale of security).
144. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2301. Under the "sale of business" doctrine, the transfer of
100% of stock in a closely held corporation, accompanied by a transfer of control of the
corporation to the purchaser, does not constitute a transfer of a security under the '33 and '34
Acts. See Hazen, Taking Stock Of Stock And The Sale Of Closely Held Corporation: When Is
Stock Not A Security., 62 N.C. L. REv. 393, 403-4 (1983) (sale of business doctrine also may
apply to less than 100% transfer of corporation's stock); Seldin, When Stock Is Not A Security:
The "Sale of Business" Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637, 637-38
(1982) (discussing sale of business doctrine). The rationale of the sale of business doctrine is
that because the purchaser of 100% of the stock of a corporation gains the authority to actively
control the business, no commonality or expectation of profits from the efforts of others
exists-a rationale premised in Howey. Hazen, supra, at 404. The significant inquiry under the
sale of business doctrine, however, is not merely whether the purchaser obtains the right to
actively control the business, but whether the purchaser intends to exercise that right to actually
run the business. See Seldin, supra, at 679 (purchaser's intent is significant consideration in
determining application of sale of business doctrine); see also Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306-07
(application of sale of business doctrine depends on control passing to purchaser as well as
purchaser's intent to exercise control). In Landreth, the Court found that the purchasers of
100% of the timber business, a closely held corporation, did not intend to run the sawmill
business themselves because they retained one of the owners to manage and run the business.
Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307. The Landreth Court found, therefore, that the sale of business
doctrine did not preclude the transfer of the timber company's stock from constituting a transfer
of securities. Id. at 2307-8.
145. 105 S. Ct. at 2301.
146. Id. at 2301-04.
147. Id. at 2301-02.
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The Landreth Court explained that when an instrument bears a title expressly
defined in the '33 and '34 Acts' definition of security, the instrument
generally will constitute a security under the '33 and '34 Acts. 48 The Landreth
Court then distinguished Forman as providing an exception to the general
rule when an instrument bears the label "stock."'" 9 The Landreth Court
explained that the proper inquiry of whether an instrument labelled stock
constitutes a security under the '33 and '34 Acts is whether the instrument
possesses the significant characteristics traditionally associated with stock.'50
The Landreth Court then found that the stock involved in the sale of the Mill
possessed the characteristics typically associated with stock and, therefore, con-
stituted a security.'5 ' Under the Landreth Court's reasoning, when the instru-
ment in question possesses both the label "stock" and the significant
characteristics of stock, the instrument is a security and the inquiry ends." 2
The Landreth Court rejected respondents' argument that Forman mandates
the application of the Howey test in every determination of whether a security
exists under the '33 and '34 Acts, distinguishing the line of cases applying
Howey as involving "unusual instruments not easily characterized as
'securities. "' 3 The existence of unusual characteristics associated with an in-
strument or transaction, according to Landreth, necessitates the application
of the Howey test to determine whether the instrument or transaction qualifies
as a security under the catch-all phrase "investment contract."'5 4 The Land-
reth Court, accordingly, clarified that the sole impact of Forman is to instruct
courts to apply the Howey test to instruments labelled "stock" only when
the instruments fail to carry the characteristics traditionally associated with
stock.' 5 The Landreth Court expressly declined to extend its reasoning to other
categories listed in the '33 and '34 Acts' definitions of security, noting that
stocks present the clearest case for applying the "characteristics" rationale
because of the commonly known and usual characteristics associated with
stock. 
56
148. Id. at 2302.
149. Id. at 2302-05.
150. Id. at 2304-05 & n.5. The Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth
identified the characteristics generally associated with common stock as "(i) the right to receive
dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be
pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owed; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value." Id. at 2302. The Landreth Court
noted, however, that characteristics of preferred stock may differ and yet still fall under the
'33 and '34 Acts. Id.
151. Id. at 2302-03; see supra note 150 (listing general characteristics of common stock
recognized by Landreth).
152. See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2304-05 & n.5 ('33 and '34 Acts apply to instruments that
possess characteristics consistent with the instrument's label).
153. Id. at 2304; see supra notes 98-156 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
cases applying Howey test).
154. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2305 & n.6.
155. Id. at 2303-05 & n.5.
156. Id. at 2306. The Landreth Court explained that traditional stock represents the concept
of a security to a wide range of people. Id.
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Although Landreth limits the Howey test to a secondary application
concerning instruments labeled "stock,"' 5 7 the Landreth Court actually
endorsed a broad application of the economic reality theory by requiring
courts initially to look beyond the label "stock" and to determine the
characteristics of an instrument in the commercial setting. Landreth, in
essence, instructs courts to look at the economic reality of instruments
labelled stock to determine whether the instruments bear the characteristics
of the label.5 8 Extending the economic reality rationale to determine whether
instruments labelled stock constitute securities under the'33 and '34 Acts,
Landreth supports the Supreme Court's emphasis on economic reality ex-
pressed in Howey and, consequently, accommodates a flexible interpretation
of the '33 and '34 Acts' definition of a security.5 9
In light of the Supreme Court's emphasis on economic reality and the
characteristics of an instrument in the commercial setting, the narrow concept
of vertical commonality appears the most consistent with Howey and its
progeny.'16 Courts adhering to the narrow concept of vertical commonality
forego applying the strict requirement of the horizontal view that investors
funds be pooled and, instead, examine the relationship between the parties in-
volved and the nature of the transaction that occurred.' 6' Courts applying
the narrow concept focus on the interdependency of success between the
parties of a venture, and attempt to determine whether the members intended
the arrangements to constitute an investment between or among themselves,
as in McGill, 62 or whether the investor simply intended to use the promoter
157. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (Landreth explains that Howey test
applies to instruments labeled "stock" only when instruments fail to possess characteristics
generally associated with stock).
158. See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302 (Landreth instructs courts to look beyond label of
instrument and determine characteristics actually associated with instrument).
159. See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 239 (1946) ('33 and '34 Acts definition of
security embodies flexible interpretation); 1933 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 8, at 11 (Congress
intended courts to afford broad interpretation to '33 and '34 Acts definition of security); see
also supra notes 97-159 and accompanying text (Supreme Court's development of Howey test
emphasizes that economic reality of transaction should control determination of whether security
exists).
160. See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946) (courts should disregard
form in favor of substance and focus on economic reality of transaction to determine whether
investment contract exists); S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344, 351-53 (1943)
(commercial character of instrument controls determination of whether instrument constitutes
investment contract); see also supra notes 97-159 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's development of Howey economic reality test).
161. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (narrow concept of vertical commonality
alleviates necessity of pooling of funds that horizontal commonality requires); supra notes 57-
92 and accompanying text (discussing narrow concept of vertical commonality). Focusing on
the relationship between the parties to a transaction, the narrow concept of vertical commonality
requires that only some degree of correlation exist between the enterprise members. Silverstein
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see
supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing interdependency of success requirement of
narrow vertical commonality).
162. See McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925-26 (10th Cir.
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or investment manager as a middleman to effectuate an independent invest-
ment, as in a commission broker-investor relationship.' 63
Courts following the horizontal concept, on the other hand, although
following the substance over form analysis and focusing on economic reality,
conclusively determine that an instrument or transaction does not constitute
an investment contract when only a single investor and promoter or invest-
ment manager are involved.'64 Under the horizontal approach, courts also
automatically exclude a transaction involving multiple investors if the pro-
moter has failed to either represent or effectuate a pooling of investors'
funds.' 65 The horizontal approach, therefore, fails to apply a true economic
reality analysis as contemplated by Howey because, in practice, a common
enterprise can exist in either a one-to-one relationship or a multi-investor
enterprise absent a pooling of funds.'6
While horizontal commonality circumvents a true economic reality test,
the broad concept of vertical commonality appears inconsistent with the
Howey test's requirements for an investment contract. Courts applying the
broad concept to determine the existence of an investment contract inquire
only whether one has invested money with the expectation of deriving profits
from the efficacy of another. 67 By finding that an investment contract exists
1985) (holding that investor intended to create common enterprise through joint venture with
promoter); supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text (discussing McGill).
163. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing application of narrow vertical
commonality to commission broker-investor relationships).
164. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (courts adhering to horizontal common-
ality theory require pooling of investors' funds).
165. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (significant characteristic of horizontal
commonality is pooling of investors' funds).
166. See Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(language of Howey does not require horizontal relationship between investors to create common
enterprise). In Howey, the Supreme Court stated simply that an investment contract requires
that "a person" invest money in a common enterprise. See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). Although the Howey Court failed to clarify the exact meaning of a
common enterprise, the term common enterprise is synonymous with such terms as "joint
enterprise" and "joint venture," which require the association of two or more persons in a
profit seeking enterprise. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-301 (failing to clarify meaning of common
enterprise); Locke, Existence Of Joint Venture, 12 AM. J. JUR. P.O.F.2d, 295, 305 (1977) (two
or more persons may form joint venture); BLACKs LAw DIcrIoNAY 751-752 (5th ed. 1979)
(defining "joint adventure", "joint venture" and "joint enterprise" as synonymous with
"common enterprise"). Courts adopting the horizontal concept of commonality, therefore,
apparently have read the horizontal requirement into the Howey reasoning and have overlooked
the rationale of the narrow concept of vertical commonality-to not punish a single investor
merely because he is the sole investor in a profit seeking enterprise. See Walsh v. International
Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867,871 (D. Utah 1981) (discussing rationale of narrow
concept of vertical commonality); supra notes 18, 23-41 and accompanying text (discussing
courts that have adopted horizontal commonality theory).
167. See S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974)
(transaction or scheme in which promoter's efforts and skills determine investor's fortune
satisfies commonality requirement of Howey test under broad concept of vertical commonality);
Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1255, 1237 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing
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when an investor advances money and relies on the efforts and skill of
another for a return, courts adhering to the broad concept require that a
transaction or scheme satisfy only the first and third prongs of the Howey
test. 6 By allowing a transaction or scheme to constitute an investment
contract simply on the basis that the investor relies on the efforts and skill
of a third party for success of the investment, courts following the broad
concept virtually eliminate the commonality requirement of the Howey test
because a common enterprise requires some interdependency of success
between the members of the enterprise. 69 In light of the divergence from the
Howey rationale that the application of the horizontal and broad vertical
concepts produce, the narrow concept of vertical commonality is the more
appropriate of the three approaches because the narrow concept embodies a
true substance over form analysis which omits the pooling of funds require-
ment and yet stays within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court
in Howey.'
70
In addition to providing a true economic reality analysis, the narrow
concept of vertical commonality best comports with Congress' intent that
the '33 and '34 Acts apply to the numerous schemes devised by individuals
seeking profit for themselves through the use of others' money, Courts
applying the more stringent horizontal approach limit the reach of the '33
and '34 Acts by barring the application of the '33 and '34 Acts to all two
that courts applying broad concept of vertical commonality treat commonality requirement of
Howey as satisfied if success of investment depends on promoter expertise); see also supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text (discussing broad concept of vertical commonality).
168. Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shield, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Ohio
1979); cf. supra note 16 and accompanying text (Howey test entails three requirements). See
supra notes 44-46, 56 and accompanying text (courts applying broad concept of vertical
commonality emphasize efforts and skill of promoter rather than existence of common enter-
prise).
169. See Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 n.1l (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (discussing relaxed application of Howey test exercised by courts adopting broad concept
of vertical commonality); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 311,
319 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (courts applying broad concept of vertical commonality eliminate common
enterprise requirement of Howey test); cf. Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (correlation of members' success is essential
element of any common enterprise).
170. See supra notes 57-92 and accompanying text (discussing application of narrow concept
of vertical commonality). Courts adhering to the narrow concept of vertical commonality
enforce the common enterprise prong of the Howey test by requiring some degree of interde-
pendency between the fortunes of the enterprise members. See supra notes 58-62 and accom-
panying text (discussing interdependency of success requirement of narrow concept of vertical
commonality); see also Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (any common enterprise requires some degree of correlation
between success of enterprise members).
171. See 1933 HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at II (courts should construe '33 and '34 Acts
definition of security broadly to encompass wide array of instruments commercially construed
as securities); see also S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 298-99 (1946) (Congress intended
flexible interpretation of '33 and '34 Acts definition of security to apply to various schemes
devised by profit seekers); supra notes 3, 8, 96 & 122 (discussing purpose of '33 and '34 Acts).
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party transactions as well as to schemes involving multiple investors with
individual accounts that do not involve a pooling of the funds received to
one common enterprise172 Courts following the narrow concept of vertical
commonality, on the other hand, extend the reach of the '33 and '34 Acts
beyond that allowed by the horizontal approach by holding that any degree
of correlation between the fortunes of an enterprise's members satisfies the
commonality requirement of Howey.7 1 In contrast, courts adhering to the
broad concept of vertical commonality overextend the application of the '33
and '34 Acts to relationships that do not involve a third party seeking self-
profits through the use of another's money. 7 4 For example, courts applying
the broad concept have found that simple investor-broker relationships create
a common enterprise, even though the broker seeks profits through providing
the service of trading an investor's account rather than through increasing
the value of an investor's portfolio. 7 - The correlation requirement that
courts following the narrow concept have employed, however, prevents the
expansion of the '33 and '34 Acts regulations into areas which do not involve
an interdependency of investor-promoter/investment manager success. 76
Courts adhering to the narrow concept of vertical commonality, therefore,
172. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text (discussing horizontal commonality);
see also Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (sale-
leaseback arrangement failed to satisfy horizontal commonality); supra notes 25-33 and accom-
panying text (discussing Hart).
173. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing interdependency of success
requirement of narrow concept of vertical commonality).
174. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (discussing broad concept of vertical
commonality). Courts applying the broad concept of vertical commonality have found that a
common enterprise exists when an investor relies on a third party (generally a promoter or an
investment manager) to procure profits for the investor, regardless of the fact that the third
party benefits solely from performing the services that create the profit for the investor. See
McLish v. Harris Farms, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1075, 1082-85 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (cattle feedlot
operation constituted investment contract under Howey test even though promoter benefitted
solely from services related to caring for and marketing cattle for investor); supra note 47 and
accompanying text (any discretionary brokerage account constitutes investment contract under
broad concept of vertical commonality); see also supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text
(discussing McLish). Courts following the broad concept, therefore, have extended the '33 and
'34 Acts regulatory power to transactions in which the promoter or investment manager merely
provides personal or professional services significant to the success of the enterprise. See supra
notes 44-56, 167-69 and accompanying text (discussing application of broad view of vertical
commonality). This widespread potential administration of the '33 and '34 Acts extends beyond
Congress' intent that courts apply the '33 and '34 Acts to activities involving a party attempting
to benefit himself through the use of another's money-a situation much more conducive to
foul play and misrepresentation. See supra notes 3, 8, 96 & 171 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress' intended application of '33 and '34 Acts).
175. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (under broad concept of vertical commonality
any discretionary brokerage account satisfies Howey common enterprise requirement).
176. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (courts applying narrow concept of




extend the reach of the '33 and '34 Acts to the farthest bounds that the
requirements of the Howey test suggest.'
77
Although the Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari to clarify
the Howey common enterprise requirement, 7 8 the narrow concept of vertical
commonality appears best suited to the various modern day transactions and
schemes devised by profit seekers such as promoters and investment man-
agers.179 The narrow concept is the most consistent with the Howey economic
reality test and the congressional intent of far reaching securities regulation. 80
Furthermore, the narrow concept concerns the substance of the transaction
and is dispositive of whether the transaction actually constitutes an invest-
ment contract, without the restricted view that a common enterprise requires
more than two parties.'' Accordingly, business transactions that involve a
one-to-one relationship as well as an interdependency of success between the
investor and the promoter should satisfy the common enterprise requirement
of the Howey test. 8 2 Parties conducting transactions under vertical relation-
ships involving interdependent success, therefore, should comply with the
'33 and '34 Acts to avoid liability should a court question the transaction. I'
177. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (courts adhering to narrow concept of
vertical commonality effectively employ Howey commonality requirement to relieve horizontal
pooling requirement, but necessitate some degree of success commonality).
178. See Morduant v. Incomco, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985) (declining to clarify commonality
requirement of Howey test).
179. See supra notes 57-92 and accompanying text (discussing narrow concept of vertical
commonality). Because courts applying the narrow concept of vertical commonality allow a
one-to-one relationship to create a common enterprise when the requisite correlation of success is
present, courts applying the narrow approach protect investors from dishonest promoters who
could circumvent the '33 and '34 Acts regulation under the horizontal approach by treating
each investor's account on an individual basis. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text
(courts following horizontal commonality require pooling of investors' funds); cf. supra notes
58-69 and accompanying text (courts applying narrow concept of vertical commonality reject
pooling of funds requirement and require only some degree of success interdependency among
enterprise members). In addition, unlike courts adhering to the broad concept of vertical
commonality, courts following the narrow approach do not impose federal securities regulation
on transactions which involve a promoter or investment manager providing services and skill
directed to procure a profit for the investor when the transaction does not involve the requisite
correlation of success between the parties. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text (courts
applying broad concept of vertical commonality require at least some degree of correlation
between success of enterprise members).
180. See supra notes 160-77 and accompanying text (discussing narrow concept of vertical
commonality in light of Howey test and Congress' intended application of '33 and '34 Acts).
181. See supra notes 58-92 and accompanying text (courts applying narrow concept of
vertical commonality realize that common enterprise can exist between as few as two parties).
182. See supra notes 58-92 and accompanying text (courts adhering to narrow concept of
vertical commonality find that common enterprise exists in one-to-one relationships involving
interdependent success of parties).
183. See supra notes 57, 62-92 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying narrow
concept of vertical commonality). Because courts applying the narrow concept of vertical
commonality allow a one-to-one relationship involving interdependent success to create a
common enterprise under the Howey test, transactions that involve these relationships in connection
with an investment of money with the expectation of profits from the efforts and skill of
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Furthermore, parties to transactions involving vertical relationships with
independent success between the investor and promoter or investment man-
ager must continue to recognize and be aware of the broad concept of
vertical commonality recognized by some courts.1' 4 In the event that the
Supreme Court should decide to grant certiorari and address the commonality
issue, however, the narrow concept of vertical commonality appears best
suited for today's multi-faceted investment schemes and, therefore, the Court
should endorse the narrow approach.'"
RODNEY L. MooRE
another, accordingly, will constitute investment contracts under the narrow concept as applied
to the Howey test. See id,; S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (investment
contract exists when transaction or scheme involves investment of money in common enterprise
with expectation of profits from the efforts of others). Constituting investment contracts,
consequently, will subject transactions to regulation of '33 and '34 Acts. See supra notes 5 & 7
and accompanying text ('33 and '34 Acts apply to investment contracts).
184, See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (discussing broad concept of vertical
commonality).
185, See supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text (analyzing superiority of narrow concept
of vertical commonality over both broad and horizontal concepts of commonality).
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